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A customary gender division of labor is one in which women and
men are directed towards certain tasks and/or explicitly prohibited
from performing others. We oﬀer an explanation as to why the gender
division of labor is so often enforced by custom, and why customary
gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohi-
bition. Our model builds on the literature on the marital hold-up
problem, and considers both problems in choice of specialty and hu-
man capital acquisition in a framework in which agents learn a variety
of skills and then enter the marriage market. We show that wasteful
behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in career choice and
human capital acquisition, and that both problems may be mitigated
through the customary gender division of labor. We ﬁnd, however,
that a gender division of labor is not Pareto-improving; one gender
is made worse oﬀ. Both the distributional eﬀects and welfare gains
of a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities to
exchange in markets increase.1 Introduction
Gary Becker’s (1991) work(s) on the economics of marriage began the study
of marriage and its relationship to the gender division of labor and human
capital acquisition. Becker’s theory began with the observation that spouses
could specialize in speciﬁc tasks and then engage in trade at minimal trans-
actions costs within a marriage. Specialization within marriage created the
added beneﬁt of allowing increasing returns to scale in human capital, as
specialization allows human capital to be used more intensively.
While Becker’s work provides an explanation for why a gender division
of labor exists, it does not explain why we throughout history have so often
observed a customary gender division of labor under which women and/or
men are prohibited from performing certain activities by custom, and encour-
aged to engage in others. In Becker’s model(s), there is no explicit reason
for society to sanction a gender division of labor for agents, as agents should
always ﬁnd it in their best interests to specialize when gains to doing so are
present.
So why is the gender division of labor so often dictated and rigidly en-
forced by custom? Why are both women and men so often prohibited from
engaging in speciﬁc tasks by prevailing social norms? Hadﬁeld (1999) ex-
plains customary gender divisions of labor as mechanisms that mitigate a
coordination problem in the marriage market. As specialization requires
some coordination, if agents must decide which tasks to learn without full
knowledge of the characteristics of potential spouses, a well-speciﬁed gender
division of labor prevents the possibility that men and women will fail to
coordinate on diﬀerent tasks.
In this paper we develop a complementary explanation for why a gender
division of labor might occur. In addition to considering coordination prob-
lems in the marriage market, our theory also focuses on the ways in which a
customary gender division of labor impacts educational decisions made prior
to the search for a spouse and subsequent intra-familial bargaining over the
marriage surplus. We discuss how a gender division of labor might aid in mit-
igating the marital hold-up problem, and also discuss distributional aspects
of a customary gender division of labor.
The initial work on division of marital surplus produced the observation
that treatment within marriage generally depends upon the opportunities
1available outside of marriage.1 Subsequent work focused on how the division
of surplus arising from marriage inﬂuences spouses’ prior human capital in-
vestment decisions. As spouses foresee that investments may inﬂuence the
share of marital surplus obtained in bargaining, premarital educational in-
vestments generally turn out to be suboptimal. This marital hold-up problem
appears to be robust to a variety of diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. Konrad
and Lommerud (2000) develop a model in which intra-marital time allocation
decisions are made with varying degrees of cooperation, and ﬁnd that educa-
tional decisions made in anticipation of marital time allocation are inﬂuenced
by how cooperatively time allocation decisions are made, but are generally
ineﬃcient. Vagstad (2001) studies educational decisions in a framework in
which spouses must learn how to perform both domestic and market tasks,
and ﬁnds that, because of the resulting disadvantage in surplus bargaining,
agents invest too heavily in learning market tasks and too little in learning
domestic tasks.2
Other work has focussed on the interaction between educational deci-
sions and marriage markets. Echevarria and Merlo (1999) present a model in
which marriage partners bargain simultaneously over consumption, numbers
of children, and childrens’ education; while marriage market considerations
impact educational decisions, decisions remain ineﬃcient. Peters and Siow
(2002) study human capital accumulation with assortative matching and non-
transferable utility, and ﬁnd that although educational decisions are generally
ineﬃcient, the size of the marriage market is important in assessing the de-
gree of ineﬃciency.3 Iyigun and Walsh (2003) study educational investments
prior to entry into marriage market with assortative matching, and ﬁnd that
while it is possible to sustain eﬃcient educational decisions, this possibility
depends critically on the nature of the marriage market. Felli and Roberts
(2002) investigate the degree to which investment ineﬃciencies depend on
market frictions, and ﬁnd both eﬃcient and ineﬃcient equilibria educational
decisions; as competition reaches its peak and coordination failures disap-
1See Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), and Lundberg and Pollak
(1993,1994). Lundberg and Pollak (1996) reviews the literature.
2Lundberg (2002) develops a similar model in which spouses anticipate joint decisions
over the allocation of familial time, and asks whether or not credible compensatory rules
can be set up within marriage that encourage optimal decisions prior to marriage.
3Peters (2004) studies education and assortative matching problems more generally.
See also Clark and Kanbur (2004), who delve more deeply into whether or not assortative
matching in fact obtains in matching markets.
2pear, investments become eﬃcient. In a similar framework, Cole, Mailath,
and Postlewaite (2001a, 2001b) describe how varying degrees of speciﬁcity
impact the nature of prior investments made in anticipation of bargaining
over marital surplus. They ﬁnd that while there exist bargaining rules that
support eﬃcient investments, there is no guarantee that the “right” bargain-
ing rule will be implemented. One of the chief lessons of this literature,
then, is that the hold-up problem is robust to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations,
although its exact nature and importance depend upon marriage market
characteristics, how outside-marriage options are speciﬁed, and how outside
options and the marriage market interact.
In the broader literature on the hold-up problem, a variety of diﬀerent
solutions to hold-up problems have been explored, including shifting prop-
erty rights (Williamson (1985), Hart and Moore (1990)), legal remedies for
breach of contract (MacLeod and Malcomson (1993)), and wage-posting and
directed search (Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)).4 Our work suggests that a
gender division of labor, or more generally, institutions that prohibit agents
from performing certain tasks and encourage them to engage in others, may
also mitigate the hold-up problem. Our theory combines elements of the
standard model of education, time allocation, and surplus division (as in
Konrad and Lommerud (2000) and Lommerud (1989)), with a framework in
which spouses may learn multiple tasks (as in Vagstad (2001)). Agents then
search for complementary partners in a marriage market, match, and bar-
gain over marriage surplus, subject to an exogenous probability of marriage
dissolution.
Our model contains some notable innovations. One innovation is the way
in which we model the returns agents expect to receive outside of marriage.
We allow agents limited opportunity for exchange and specialization outside
of marriage. This generalizes the approach of Vagstad (2001) and Lundberg
(2002), who describe tasks as “market” or “domestic” work; we allow each
potential task performed to be, to varying degrees, market or domestic work.
Further, our model characterizes the marriage market diﬀerently than the as-
sortative matching frameworks employed by Iyigun and Walsh (2003), Felli
and Roberts (2002), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a, 2001b), Peters
and Siow (2002), and Peters (2004), and explicitly builds in marriage market
frictions. In our model, agents engage in search for a complementary partner
4See Williamson (1985) or Grossman and Hart (1986) for description of the general
hold-up problem.
3subject to frictions, where we use a matching process to characterize fric-
tions in the marriage market, as in Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and
Pissarides (2000). Our method allows the diﬃculty or ease with which an al-
ternative spouse may be found to enter into the determination and division of
marital surplus, and also allows us to assess the interaction between marriage
market factors and the incentives to acquire diﬀerent types of skills.5
We describe the two types of social problems which may arise in the
model as the career choice problem and the jack-of-all-trades problem; these
two problems can be thought of as dimensions of the incentive problem de-
scribed by Vagstad (2001) that arise when agents have to choose between
learning market and domestic tasks. The career choice problem arises be-
cause agents of both genders prefer to learn tasks that are more marketable.
When equipped with more marketable skills, agents command a larger share
of the surplus created when married. However, this eﬀect may lead to relative
scarcity in the marriage market for those who specialize in less marketable
skills, which increases their bargaining power. We show that this problem
has the potential to generate fewer marriages than are socially desirable, and
too many specialists in marketable tasks.
The jack-of-all-trades problem is the standard hold-up problem captured
by much of the literature on education and bargaining within marriage, and is
similar to the basic incentive problems discussed by Konrad and Lommerud
(2000), Vagstad (2001), and Lundberg (2002). It is the result of what can
be called an under-specialization incentive. In our model, agents learn a
variety of tasks to ensure a reasonable living when not married, but also face
a strategic incentive to learn a variety of tasks. To the extent that one is
better oﬀ when not married if one is self-suﬃcient, this aﬀects the bargaining
within marriage over surplus, and self-suﬃcient agents are able to command a
larger share of the marriage surplus. We show that this problem may generate
less productive marriages which a gender division of labor may alleviate at
cost: those agents who are not married and currently searching for partners
are less able to subsist. The formalization of this tradeoﬀ allows one to assess
the circumstances under which a gender division of labor increases societal
welfare.
One usefulness of bargaining models of marital surplus division is the in-
5In some respects, our work carries out an agenda outlined by Vagstad (2001), who
notes the need for careful consideration of the impact of the functioning of the marriage
market on the incentives spouses have to learn market and domestic tasks.
4sight they lend into the forces behind the relative treatment of spouses within
marriage. This body of theory, is, for example, able to explain the observed
negative correlation between the treatment of women within marriage and
womens’ opportunities outside of marriage. This relationship has borne itself
out in a variety of settings, as described in Bahr (1972), Blood and Wolfe
(1960), Buric and Zelevic (1967), Heer (1958, 1963), Rodman (1967), Saﬁlios-
Rothschild (1967), Scanzoni (1972) and Saltzman-Chafetz (1995). The neg-
ative correlation between treatment within marriage and ability to function
outside of it also applies in less developed countries (Blumberg (1988)), and
emerges across cultures of very diﬀerent levels of sophistication (Rodman
(1967)).
In practice, it seems that throughout history the gender division of labor
is somewhat arbitrary. Consider table 1, from Jacobsen (1998: 217) using
data from Murdock (1967). The table uses data from 863 past and present
societies to create a simple breakdown for 11 activity groups by whether
only or mostly men, both genders equally, or only or mostly women perform
chores in the activity group. While some tasks, such as hunting, are almost
exclusively men’s activities, many tasks are not consistently allocated to one
gender or the other, even though in a majority of cases, only one gender
performs the task; agriculture, appearing at the bottom of the table, is per-
haps the best example of this phenomenon.6 This is in contrast to Becker’s
assertion that the gender division of labor is driven by biological diﬀerences
between men and women and therefore should be relatively consistent across
societies.7 In consideration of this evidence, Hadﬁeld (1999) notes that the
basic coordination problem in skill acquisition does not imply that particular
tasks need be done by either men or women, just that some gender division of
labor be speciﬁed. Our theory has similar implications; the important thing
about task segregation is not which tasks are allocated to which gender, but
instead that some task segregation be speciﬁed to coordinate in the marriage
6In a more detailed array of 46 sub-activities compiled for a set of 224 nonindustrial
societies, Murdock (1937) ﬁnds these same general patterns, namely the prevalence of
assignment to one or the other gender rather than non-gender-typing of activities, and the
variation across societies for most activities regarding which gender actually performs the
task. See Jacobsen (1998: 218) for a reprinting of these data.
7This patterning also contrasts to another biological-diﬀerence-based theory of the
gender division of labor posited by Galor and Weil (1996), who suggest that men have
comparative advantage in physical tasks and women in mental tasks; thus gendered labor
divisions would be comparable for societies at the same level of development.
5market and restrict strategic investment problems.
We show that a customary gender division of labor may mitigate both the
jack-of-all-trades problem as well as the career choice problem by forcing one
segment of the population to learn speciﬁc tasks.8 We also show that such
rules have distributional consequences: the relative position of one spouse
within marriage may be worsened, resulting in poorer treatment both within
marriage and outside of it. Thus, a gender division of labor may increase
welfare, but this increase in overall welfare may not be Pareto-improving for
both genders. These arguments together are suggestive as to why customary
gender divisions of labor have proven to be so enduring, even when seemingly
anachronistic. Our results indicate that a customary gender division of labor
might have social value in some circumstances, but, to some degree, occurs
at the expense of the disadvantaged gender and may harm the ability of
individuals to function outside of marriage. Further, one gender may have a
vested interest in maintaining the customary gender division of labor because
of the distributional consequences of the rule.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic framework
Becker (1991: Chapter 2) models human capital acquisition, marriage, and
time devoted to production as a simultaneous choice. Matching and bar-
gaining models of marriage typically modify this framework so that decisions
are made sequentially, in which educational investments are made ﬁrst, then
matching in the marriage market occurs, marriage terms are negotiated, and
time allocation decisions are made. We follow this conventional sequence of
events.
The population consists of type m and type f agents; the number of each
type of agent is normalized to one.9 All agents gain utility from consuming
8In this sense, our theory, like Lundberg (2002), focuses on ways in which marital
hold-up and coordination problems might be solved, rather than discussing the details of
the problem. Lundberg’s focus is primarily on family policy, while ours is on the role of
custom.
9Like most models of marriage, our model posits only two types of agents. Interestingly,
a number of societies feature what is, in eﬀect, a third gender role. These roles have been
found in a number of societies, including a number of American Indian tribes, where such
roles appear to be inextricably tied to homosexual behavior, as well as the xanith in Oman,
6two consumption goods, a and b, according to a utility function:
u = u(a,b).
The utility function has the standard shape: ua > 0,ub > 0,uaa < 0,ubb < 0,
and both goods are essential: u(0,b) = u(a,0) = 0.
Agents have one unit of labor time to allocate to production of either
good. The amount of time devoted to production of good a is t, so the
amount of time devoted to production of good b is 1 − t.
The total amount of output that an agent can produce depends on his/her
skill set. As is also typical in the literature, we assume that production occurs
according to a linear technology. The amount of good a an agent can produce
is given by
a = αt,
where t is the time allocated to production of good a, and the total amount
of good b that an agent is capable of producing is:
b = β(1 − t).
Agents’ skill sets are captured by the parameters α and β. Agents are not
endowed with skills naturally, but must engage in costly learning to acquire
skills. We follow Rosen (1983) in specifying the costs of acquiring skills.
These costs are:
ci = ci(α,β); i = f,m.
The cost function has the standard shape: cα > 0,cβ > 0,cαα > 0,cββ >
0,cαβ ≥ 0. The subscripts on the costs-of-learning function allow for potential
diﬀerences in the costs of learning across genders, but do not preclude the
possibility that women and men are identical in their capacity to learn tasks.
In fact, we focus primarily on the case in which cf = cm; thus, we posit that
there are no biological diﬀerences in the capacity to learn diﬀerent tasks.
However, by allowing for cost functions to vary, one could study the impact
the mahu of Tahiti, and the hijra in India (Jacobsen 1998: 401). There is some debate
over whether these third-gender persons took on cross-gender roles or truly ﬁlled a third
position within societies with diﬀerent associated tasks. This second possibility posits an
interesting additional modelling problem for future research.
7of biological diﬀerences between men and women on the gender division of
labor.
In the ﬁrst phase of the game, agents learn skills. We ﬁnd it convenient
to characterize learning as choice taking place over two dimensions: choice
of a specialty, which is akin to choosing a comparative advantage, and then
choice of α and β, the degree to which each task is learned. 10An agent applies
his or her specialty skill when the possibility of specialization presents itself,
but is free to apply his or her secondary skill as needed, when the option
to specialize is not available. After agents have simultaneously decided on
specialties and learning, the second stage of the game commences.
In the second phase of the game, agents enter a marriage market in which
they match with a complementary partner of the opposite gender and spe-
cialty. Those women who have elected to specialize in producing good a
enter a marriage market in which they search for men who have specialized
in producing good b, and vice versa. The marriage market is assumed to be
segmented, so that type f agents who have specialized in production of good
a face no possibility of encountering a type m agent who is also specialized
in production of good a. There are potentially two marriage markets, one in
which type f agents specializing in a production are matched with type m
agents specializing in production of b, and one in which type f agents spe-
cialized in production of good b are matched with type m agents specializing
in production of good a. Within each market, agents randomly encounter
complementary agents of the opposite type.11 Our results are robust to the
case in which matching occurs randomly across opposite-gender agents of all
specialty, but the analysis is a bit more complicated in the more general case.
In the limiting case in which all women, for example, specialize in the same
task, there is only one market segment.
As in other models of marriage and production, marriage generates re-
turns to its participants by creating a low-transactions costs environment
within which two agents with complementary skills can engage in special-
ization, production, and exchange. A clear statement of the value created
by the marriage environment requires description of the returns agents can
achieve outside of marriage. Thus, we ﬁrst describe agents’ autarkic, “outside
10In this regard, our model is similar to Lundberg (2002) and Vagstad (2001), who also
model multidimensional educational choices.
11This is a model of segmented market search; see Acemoglu (1997). In most other
ways, our model closely mirrors the classic search and matching model due to Diamond
(1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (2000).
8marriage” returns.
2.2 Autarkic utilities and potential for exchange
Autarkic utility forms an important part of an agent’s leverage in bargaining
over the gains to marriage, and also describes the well-being of agents when
they are not married, engaged in search for a complementary partner. For
these two reasons, autarkic returns occupy an important place in our model
and warrant a detailed discussion.
We begin by noting that if an agent is not matched with a marriage
partner and has no other opportunities for exchange, he or she must allocate




where t∗, the agent’s optimal allocation of eﬀort between the two tasks,
lies strictly between zero and one. Marriage is one such opportunity for
specialization and exchange, but generally speaking, agents may have some
opportunity for specialization and exchange even if not married, for instance,
through access to labor and goods markets or some alternative institution.
For utmost simplicity, we imagine that the relative price of good a is one,
thus, if an agent were able to ﬁnd such an exchange opportunity, the agent
could earn utility:
e(α) = u(α(1 − x
∗),αx
∗). (2)
Expression (2) is similar to (1) with one notable exception. As stressed by
our notation, the function e(α) depends only on the agent’s ability to perform
his or her specialty task, while h depends upon the agent’s ability to perform
both tasks. The possibility of exchange allows the agent to replace his or her
autarkic opportunity cost trade-oﬀ with that in the market, as in any model
of comparative advantage.
To reﬂect the idea that the agent may not always have an exchange and
specialization opportunity, we adopt a simplistic framework in which the
agent encounters an exchange opportunity with some exogenous probability
p. Thus, an agent who has specialized in production of good a earns expected
utility:
u





9The same chain of logic applies to an agent who has specialized in production
of good b:
u





The probabilities pa and pb are natural, if simplistic, measures of the degree
to which exchange opportunities exist outside of marriage. The inclusion of
the probability of encountering an exchange opportunity outside of marriage
is our way of measuring the speciﬁcity of investments, which emerges as a cru-
cial factor in analyzing investment decisions in diﬀerent, yet related models
such Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a,b). Further, this modelling tech-
nique generalizes the approach of other work that focuses on the distribution
of eﬀort among spouses between “market” work and “domestic” work, as in
Konrad and Lommerud (2000), Vagstad (2001), and Lundberg (2002).12 In
our model, each task is potentially domestic and/or market work, depending
on the probability of encountering an outside exchange opportunity. This will
allow us to see how the potential role for a gender division of labor changes
as tasks vary in the degree to which they are domestic or market work. A
ﬁnal point worth establishing is that, as long as an agent is not equally gifted
at the two tasks, autarkic utility is strictly increasing in the degree to which
an outside exchange opportunity is present.
2.3 Marriage returns and marriage surplus
Following Becker (1991), in our model the gains to marriage stem from the
fact that marriage is a zero transactions costs environment, and agents can
therefore specialize and exchange within marriage to maximum joint advan-
tage.13 If marriage partners are able to produce some amounts aw and bw
of goods a and b, they may costlessly negotiate agreements which result in
a Pareto-optimal distribution of these quantities within the marriage. Since
agents are assumed to have identical preferences, a Pareto-optimal distribu-
tion of goods within marriage gives each agent an equal consumption bundle.
12While our approach generalizes that taken in previous literature, we still have avoided
explicitly modelling outside marriage exchange institutions, though we shall discuss some
related issues at further length below.
13This framework is similar to Becker’s original formulation, and is also similar to that
employed in Hatﬁeld (1999). Contrast this with “public goods” models of marriage, in
which marital surplus arises through provision of public goods within marriage, as in
Lommerud (1989), Vagstad (2001), and Lundberg (2002).
10Then, assuming u to be homogenous of degree one in its arguments, the total







bw) = u(aw,bw). (5)
If the couple must produce all goods itself, and neither marriage partner
has any opportunity for exchange outside of marriage, time allocations are
chosen to maximize (5) given the skills of the spouses. In what follows, we
focus on the case in which the type f agent is an α specialist, while the type
m agent is a β specialist. Substituting production functions into (5) gives:
W = u(αftf + αmtm,βf(1 − tf) + βm(1 − tm)). (6)
In this context Becker (1991: 33) shows that it is optimal for at least one
agent to specialize completely in production of one good. Like Hadﬁeld
(1999), we also ﬁnd it easier to work with a stronger case of Becker’s result,
and assume that full specialization is optimal, so that within marriage each
agent fully allocates all of his or her time to his or her specialty.14 Thus, in
the event that there is no potential to enter into exchange agreements outside
of marriage, we may write total marriage returns as:
H = H(αf,βm).
So far, we have assumed that married agents have no potential to engage
in exchange outside of marriage in a labor market. What if the couple had
an opportunity to trade a for b? In this case the married couple achieves
utility:
E






f is the optimal quantity of good a that the couple exchanges in the
market at the assumed 1:1 trade ratio. We might also consider the case in
which the type m agent is able to exchange b for a:
E





14We thus sidestep some of the complexities involved in choosing marital allocations of
time for reasons of tractability. Our chief purpose is describing in simple fashion gains
to specialization. The time allocation has been studied extensively in, for example, Lom-
merud (1989) and Konrad and Lommerud (2000). Still, in the present paper, agents do
spend some amount of their lifetime executing both tasks as a result of search frictions.
11How does the presence of exchange opportunities inﬂuence marriage returns?
Since we assumed the two goods entered into the utility function in the same
way, the marginal gains from engaging in market exchange for one good can
be studied by diﬀerentiating the utility function with respect to xf or xm,










The above expression may be either positive or negative, and depends on the
marginal utilities of the two goods at the productivity levels/output levels
αf,βm. Since the two goods enter the utility function in exactly the same
fashion, we have the following:
∂Ea
∂xf
< 0 if αf < βm,
∂Ea
∂xf
= 0 if αf = βm,
∂Ea
∂xf
> 0 if αf > βm.
This indicates that there are gains to engaging in an exchange opportunity
only if, for example, the type f agent has an absolute advantage in producing
good a so that αf > βm. A similar argument would illustrate that this is
also true when an opportunity to exchange good b presents itself. We thus
have the following form of marriage returns, taking into the account the
probabilities with which exchange opportunities present themselves:
W(αf,βm) = H(1 − pa) + paEa, αf > βm,
H, αf = βm,
H(1 − pb) + pbEb, αf < βm. (7)
A similar function W(βf,αm) can be developed for the case in which the
agents have chosen alternative specialties. As in the case of individual agents’
returns, note further that marriage returns never depend on either agents’
ability to perform their non-specialty task. If married, agents fully specialize,
regardless of whether or not an outside exchange opportunity presents itself.
122.4 Matching and the search for a marriage partner
Once agents have made skill acquisition decisions, agents enter a matching
game in which they may be matched to an agent with a complementary skill
set, by which we mean an agent of the opposite type who has a comparative
advantage in production of the other good. When matched with a comple-
mentary partner, agents of opposite types and skill sets immediately strike a
Nash bargain over division of the marriage surplus, and then engage in joint
production and distribution. If agents are not matched, they produce alone
for a period and then reenter the matching process in the next period. With
positive probability at the beginning of every period, those agents that were
married are separated from their spouses by exogenous forces at the rate s.
When separation occurs, agents produce alone one period and then reenter
the matching game the following period.15
There are potentially four types of agents in the model: type f agents who
specialize in production of good a, type f agents who specialize in production
of good b, type m agents who specialize in production of good a, and type
m agents who specialize in production of good b. Since we have normalized
the size of each population of agents to be of measure 1, we can denote the
population frequency of each type of agent as fa, fb, ma, and mb, respectively.
We shall also use this notation to refer to each type of agent.
We denote the percentage of agents of each type that are unmarried
by including a “U” subscript, so the fraction of unmarried fa is fa
U. The
matching technology describing the process by which unmarried fi agents








where either ij = ab, denoting the case in which type f agents specializing
in production of good a are matched to type m agents with specialty b, or
ij = ba, denoting the opposite case. We assume that w is continuous and
homogenous of degree one.
Using the matching technology, we can explicitly describe the solution
for lifetime utilities, matching probabilities, and the fraction of the lifetime
the typical agent spends married. The matching technology can be used
to describe the ﬂow of agents into and out of marriage. For example, the
15We assume that there is an exogenous separation rate for largely technical reasons.
We do, however, expound on the role of the separation rate in ensuing sections. A good
discussion of time allocation under the threat of divorce is Lommerud (1989).
13fraction of fi agents and mj agents who are unmarried at any given time













U) + s(mj − m
j
U). (8)
The ﬁrst expression on the right-hand side of each of the equations in (8)
describes the number of unmarried agents who match, marry, and thus exit
the unmarried state, while the second term on the right hand side of the two
equations in (8) describes the number of married agents who are separated
from their current match, and thus enter into the pool of unmatched agents;
in writing these expressions, we have exploited the fact that fi = fi
M + fi
U.
This simply means that the fraction of married and unmarried agents must
add up to the total number of type f agents specialized in production of
good i.
In steady state equilibrium, it must be the case that ˙ fi
U = and ˙ m
j
U = 0.













The equalities in (9) mean that the ﬂow of unmarried fi agents who
match in the marriage market must equal the ﬂow of mj agents who match








Equation (10) indicates that the number of unmatched agents on one side of
the market is generally equal to the number of unmatched agents on the other
side of the marriage market only when the number of participants on each
side of the market is equal. If it should be the case, for example, that there
are more fi agents than mj agents, the result would be that there are, at any
given time, more unmatched fi agents than mj agents. This has important
ramiﬁcations for the probability that any type of agent ﬁnds a match when
searching for a marriage partner, and also impacts bargaining over marriage
surplus. The steady-state probability that an unmarried type fi agent ﬁnds



























Note that the equilibrium match probability (11) for a type fi agent is
increasing the number of mj agents in the market, and decreasing in the
number of fi agents in the market. Equation (10) indicates that qi
f and qj
m
will only be equal when there are equal numbers of fi agents and mj agents
in the marriage market.
Let V denote the (steady state) lifetime utility of a married agent, R
denote the lifetime utility of an unmarried agent, and S the share of marriage
surplus obtained by the agent. In a steady state, the lifetime utility of a type










while the steady state lifetime utility of a type k agent specializing in i






























r(r + s + qi
k)
. (16)
Describing the division of the marriage surplus closes the model. We fol-
low convention and suppose that surplus is divided according to an instan-
taneous symmetric Nash bargain. Surplus shares Si
f and Sj
m are determined




















15The share coeﬃcients ∆i
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To aid in keeping the subscripts and superscripts straight, if we chose k =
m,l = f we could take i = a or j = b to examine the case in which type m
agents specialize in production of a and type f agents specialize in production
of b, for example.
The shares in (19) reﬂect the idea that bargaining power depends on the
proportion of each type of agent in the population. Note that the share equa-
tions described by (19) imply that ∆ = 1
2 when there are equal proportions
of type f and type m agents participating in a marriage market, as in this
case, the equilibrium matching probabilities (11) and (12) are equal (recall
further the discussion of steady state fractions of each type of agent search-
ing for a marriage partner at equations (9) and (10)). If there are not equal
proportions of complementary agents in the marriage market, the relatively
scarce side of the marriage market enjoys a bargaining advantage which is
reﬂected by a larger value of ∆. This is because the scarcer side of the market
matches more easily as reﬂected by a larger value of q, which in turn implies
a larger value of ∆.
Since agents move in and out of marriage according to a two-state Markov
process in equilibrium, in the long run, an agent of any type and spe-









unmarried. Weighting each value function by the fraction of time spent in
marriage and the the fraction of time spent away from marriage admits the





16Lifetime utility depends on the fraction of time spent married, the division of
the marriage returns, and the fraction of time that each agent spends in each
state. Our primary instrument in analyzing specialty selection and human
capital acquisition, any resulting impacts on the relative welfare of the sexes,
and optimal decisions with and without a customary gender division of labor
is U in (20), coupled with the shares of surplus described in (19).
2.5 Strategic specialty choice
There are two potential types of social problems that occur in our model,
both of which may be mitigated by a customary gender division of labor.
The ﬁrst problem, which is the focus of this section, blends elements of a
coordination problem with strategic choice of specialty. One might describe
this section of the paper as developing the marriage market ramiﬁcations of
of the results described in Vagstad (2001) and Lundberg (2002) pertaining to
agents’ choices in learning market and domestic work. As Vagstad showed,
agents prefer to learn market tasks because of the leverage gained in marital
surplus bargaining. The exposition of our model in this subsection develops
some of the nuances of this this picture, and also supplements understanding
of the coordination model of Hadﬁeld (1999).
We begin by describing career choice in the absence of a customary gender
division of labor. To isolate the career choice aspect of the problem, suppose
that there is no inherent diﬀerence between type f agents and type m agents
and that the costs of learning to produce good a or good b as a specialty
are equal. Further, suppose that career choice is discrete, so an individual
chooses a career at a ﬁxed cost c, and thereby gains a bundle of skills, denoted
by (αa,βa) for an agent specializing in a production, and (αb,βb) for an agent
















These assumptions imply that the acquired skill bundles are mirror images of
one another. Since agents are identical, there is no diﬀerence in the aggregate
returns created by either type of marriage (i. e., either an a to b type marriage
or a b to a marriage), so regardless of which gender performs which task




2 ). The neglect of whether or not an exchange opportunity for
either good is present is made possible by our assumptions that neither agent
has an absolute advantage in production, and that the goods receive equal
weight in the utility function, as described in section 2.3, equation (7).
The specialty choice game has an easily-characterizable set of equilibria.
There are two pure strategy equilibria in which all agents of each type spe-
cialize in production of the same good, and a mixed strategy equilibrium
in which positive fractions of agents specialize in both tasks. The two pure
strategy equilibria cannot in general be Pareto ranked, as they both generate
equal social welfare. However, each gender strictly prefers the equilibrium in
which he or she is more specialized in the relatively more marketable task.
To be more explicit, consider the pure strategy equilibrium in which all
type f agents specialize in production of good a, while all type m agents
specialize in production of good b. In this case, the probability of ﬁnding a
mate when unmarried is equal for both types of agent (indeed, the measure




l = q. The lifetime utilities described by (20) and the























In this case, recall that the shares of the surplus described by (19) reduce to
1
2.
Social welfare is the sum of utility obtained by both types, weighted by







Suppose now that there is a diﬀerence in the returns individuals earn due
to diﬀerences in the likelihood agents of diﬀerent specialties are able to ﬁnd
outside exchange opportunities. In particular, suppose that pa < pb, from
18which it follows that ua
f < ub
m (see equations (3) and (4)). Thus, ceteris
paribus, agents prefer the equilibrium in which they specialize in the task for
which there are more exchange opportunities outside of marriage; note how
the diﬀerence ub
m − ua
f enters into the utility functions in (21).
These results imply that each gender prefers the pure-strategy equilibrium
in which they are specialized in the relatively more marketable task. How
might one measure the gains which accrue to society from this eﬀect more
generally? As a benchmark for the no-coordination case, consider the mixed-
strategy equilibrium in which some fraction of agents of both types specialize
in both tasks.16 In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, agents of both types must










Since pa < pb, it follows that ua < ub (see equations (3) and (4). This leads
to the implication that at the mixed-strategy equilibrium, unequal numbers
of each type of agent in the market. Speciﬁcally, fb > fa, and mb > ma, so
that more agents of each gender specialize in the relatively more marketable
task. This is because, when ua < ub, when there are equal numbers of each
type of agent in the marriage market, Ua < Ub, indicating that some agents
specializing in production of a could switch to b production and earn strictly
greater utility.
This argument renders clear how utilities are equilibrated across special-
ties. As agents move towards more marketable tasks, those that are special-
ized in unmarketable tasks grow scarcer. Because they are relatively scarce
in the marriage market, they are able to obtain a share of surplus in marriage
bargaining that oﬀsets the disadvantage due to specialization in the nonmar-
ketable task. One may employ these results to show that, even though one
of the pure strategy equilibria increases social welfare, it may not necessary
generate a Pareto improvement for each type of agent. Consider the utility
of f agents specialized in a at the pure strategy equilibrium; this utility is
given by the second part of (21). At the mixed-strategy equilibrium, this
16There remains the diﬃcult conceptual question as to whether or not the mixed-strategy
equilibrium is the appropriate baseline for describing outcomes in a completely uncoor-
dinated environment. In this game, there is no natural focal point, and neither pure
strategy equilibrium is a natural choice over the other, so the mixed strategy equilibrium
















m denote the equilibrium share
of surplus obtained at the mixed strategy equilibrium. Since fa < mb at the
mixed strategy equilibrium, we have qa
f > q > qb






m. Lifetime utility (23) at the mixed strategy equilibrium can
















For utility at the pure strategy equilibrium to be greater than utility at the
mixed strategy equilibrium, the following inequality must hold, using (21)











































The sign of (25) is ambiguous. The term on the right-hand side of the in-
equality in (25) is positive, as qa
f > q, meaning that those specialized in
non-marketable tasks are more likely to ﬁnd matches at the mixed-strategy




greater than zero, and since ∆
b
m < 1
2, µm is less than zero. Thus, one may
conclude that a switch from a mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which both
genders perform both tasks, to a pure strategy equilibrium, in which each
gender performs a speciﬁc task, produces ambiguous results on the utility of
the gender which is forced to specialize in the less marketable task. Consider
inequality (25) as the term ua
f gets very small; this may happen, for example,
because an individual specialized in production of good a cannot produce b
well, and/or has almost no opportunity to engage in exchange outside of
20marriage; in short, this agent’s skills are relatively speciﬁc to marriage. As
the ua
f term goes to zero, the inequality in (25) cannot be satisﬁed, as the
right-hand side goes to zero while the left-hand side remains strictly posi-
tive. This happens because at the coordinated equilibrium, agents specialized
in the relatively marriage-speciﬁc task no longer have the twin advantages
gained through relative scarcity: easier matching, and the resulting increase
in bargaining power.
Thus, in the circumstance in which one gender learns a highly marriage-
speciﬁc task, the gender division of labor may be welfare-improving but not
Pareto-improving. This result reinforces explanations for several features of
a customary gender division of labor. For example, the fact that the gender
division of labor might be welfare-increasing in circumstances in which there
are limited opportunities to engage in exchange and specialization outside
of marriage, and when agents do not or must not spend a large fraction
of their lives unmarried, makes strong intuitive sense. Further, the idea
that a customary gender division of labor puts the party with relatively less
marketable skills at a disadvantage in bargaining over the marriage surplus,
and therefore leaves this party with a smaller share of the marriage surplus
and in some sense, treated relatively less well within marriage, also coincides
with empirical observation.
The ﬂip side of the result that the gender division of labor reduces the
utility of one party relative to the mixed strategy equilibrium is that it in-
creases the utility of the other relative to the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Thus, a motive for the party in relative power to maintain the gender di-
vision of labor even after it has outlived its welfare-enhancing properties is
suggested by this work.
2.6 Customary gender division of labor and the hold-
up problem
We begin this section by illustrating the incentive problem that occurs when
there is no customary gender division of labor, but now focus on reasons
why one agent type may be explicitly prohibited, possibly by social sanction,
from performing one task or the other. We show that relative to the social
optimum, agents invest too much in learning tasks that they do not perform
when married, and invest too little in tasks that they do. This investment
strategy renders agents less reliant on marriage, and thus better-positioned
21to bargain over marriage terms. In some circumstances, a customary gender
division of labor, by prohibiting agents from engaging in certain tasks, may
reduce agents’ incentives to learn tasks they will not specialize in marriage.
Not surprisingly, the rule has distributional consequences that may cause a
reduction in lifetime utility for one party relative to a regime in which there is
no customary gender division of labor, though this eﬀect may be neutralized
if both groups are restricted in the tasks that they may perform. This latter
possibility amounts to a case in which the gender division of labor forces both
parties to marriage away from a noncooperative investment equilibrium and
closer to a cooperative one, though a two-sided gender division of labor is an
imperfect means of accomplishing this.
To keep things simple, we focus on one pure strategy equilibrium: one
in which all type f agents specialize in production of good a when married,
and all type m agents specialize in production of good b when married. This
isolates our study of incentives from our investigation of specialty choice
in the previous section. It also allows us to illustrate clearly an additional
motive as to why a society might wish to prohibit members of one group from
engaging in certain tasks, beyond simply directing them towards a certain
specialty.
Consider the human capital investment decision of one type f agent, ˆ f,
given the behavior of all other type f agents and all type m agents (Indeed,
throughout this section we shall treat the decisions of type m agents as ﬁxed).
Whenever matched with a type m agent (adopting the convention that all
variables pertaining to ˆ f are marked with a hat), ˆ f receives a share of the





m = ˆ V
a
f − ˆ R
a
f (27)
Equation (27) indicates that the division of the surplus ˆ f receives depends on
the population characteristics of agents of both types. If any type m agent
were to refuse marriage with ˆ f, in the next period he would be matched
with the “typical” type f agent, as the probability of seeing ˆ f again is zero.
If we ﬁrst solve for the standard division of the surplus described by (17),
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Consider now the individual type ˆ fa agent’s incentive to invest in learning










































By contrast, maximization of social welfare with respect to the type f






























Comparing social welfare and individual returns allows one to see the
sources of the incentive problem in human capital acquisition decisions.
Agents excessively weight outside-marriage returns, and weight too little
within-marriage returns as evidenced by the presence of additional ∂ua
∂a and
∂ua
∂b terms in expressions (31) and (32) relative to (33) and (34).17 The basic
17There is in fact another incentive problem at work, which emerges because agents do
not consider the impact of human capital investments on the bargaining opportunities of
others. We do not discuss this externality here: see Acemoglu (1997).
23incentive problem is essentially that described by Vagstad (2001). Agents
maximize the share of the surplus they are able to obtain through bargain-
ing, and not the surplus itself. From the perspective of society, this agent
invests too little in learning the task that will be performed in marriage,
and too much in learning the task that will not be performed in marriage.
However, note that the socially optimal investment in the non-specialty task
described by (34) does imply that the agent should invest in some eﬀort in
learning task how to produce good b. If it is hard to ﬁnd a match in the
marriage market, or if the rate of separation is high, equation (34) implies
that the marginal social beneﬁts from fa agents learning how to produce b
increase. This is because under these circumstances, they are likely to spend
a sizeable fraction of their lifetimes unmarried, and may need to be able to
perform task b to subsist.
A customary gender division of labor may under some circumstances mit-
igate the incentive problem, but, in light of (34), it may go too far. A gender
division of labor takes the form of a restriction on the set of activities that a
type f agent may perform. If the agent is prohibited from performing task b,
for example, the result is the agent simply chooses b = 0; there is no reason
to learn how to do something that the agent will never be allowed to do. If
b is restricted to be zero, the result may either increase or decrease social
welfare; welfare increases because strategic investment incentives are elimi-
nated, but welfare decreases because type fa agents are now more helpless
when not married.
Consider the following discrete-choice example, in which type f agents
specialize in production of good a, but must decide whether or not to learn
to perform task b. In the event that an agent has learned the task, we
normalize their skill level to 1, so α = 1. The agent must decide whether
or not to choose β = 1. Take the utility function to be u = a1/2b1/2. It
then follows that the agent will choose t∗ = 1/2 if no market is available,
and x∗ = 1/2 if a market is available. Then, from (1) and (2), we obtain the
following expression for autarkic utility when the agent has chosen to learn
how to produce good b (β = 1):
u
a
f(β = 1) =
1
2












Expression (35) reﬂects the fact that the agent is not self-suﬃcient if there is
no potential for accessing outside markets. Using (29), we can compute the











By applying (30), we can compute the gain in social welfare due due to the







Figure 1 graphs ∆Ua
f and ∆SW as functions of pa, the probability that
the individual is able to access a labor market. The social returns to learning
the task are generally less than the private returns, as social returns do not
consider the distributional impact of learning additional tasks. On ﬁgure 1,
the gap between the two causes a social problem only in the region between
the dashed lines, when pa is of moderate size. Why does this happen? When
pa is very small, it may both be socially and individually desirable for type
f agents to learn how to produce good b, as there is little chance of self-
suﬃciency outside of marriage if agents are completely specialized. On the
other hand, when pa is very large, it is both socially and individually desirable
that agents not learn how to produce b. This is because the high pa implies
ample specialization opportunities outside of marriage, and the agent is more
often than not able to rely on her primary skill, and thus do not need task b.
In between the dashed lines on the ﬁgure, the private gains to learning how
to produce good b are positive, while the social gains are negative. In this
region, society would be better oﬀ if f agents did not learn how to produce
good b, but type f agents would choose to learn it. In this environment,
prohibiting type f agents from performing task b may be socially desirable,
even though it has a negative impact on type f agents’ utility.
While our model is not a model of the evolution of the gender division of
labor, it is suggestive as to why a gender division of labor originally arose, and
its impact on the relative well-being of men and women once adopted. Our
25model also suggests a link between the declining importance of the gender
division of labor over the past century in modern economies. The literature
relating family economics, fertility, and growth, draws an explicit link from
the opportunities for market participation provided by growth to changes
in family structure. For example, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) describe
how industrialization reduces the need for children, as goods traditionally
provided by children may be more cheaply purchased in the market. Hazan
and Maoz (2002), who consider explicitly the potential dynamics of formal
labor force participation over time, predict a nonlinear (S-curve) path in
which changing social norms, which are aﬀected by a change in women’s
formal labor force participation, reinforce the rise in women’s labor force
participation that is precipitated by the rising value of women’s labor outside
the home. This would tend to counteract the tendency of the gender with
the distributional advantage to resist change. Galor and Weil (1996) argue
that higher wages for women raise the costs of children relatively more than
they raise household income. Our model suggests that one aspect of this
transition is that it may decrease the importance of having a specialist in
what was traditionally viewed as non-market work in the family. Thus, as
market opportunities increase, gender roles break down, fertility declines,
and the relative treatment of women within marriage improves.
3 Conclusions
We have developed a theoretical model of the gender division of labor which
relies upon the importance of the ultimate distribution of marriage surplus
for human capital acquisition. The role of a gender division of labor is to
limit possibilities for strategic acquisition of human capital; human capital
accumulated for the purposes of gaining better treatment within marriage.
Our model is capable of explaining several phenomena which typically coexist
with the gender division of labor, such as:
1. The gender with the distributional advantage tends to have the more
marketable form of labor or the form of labor that provides the more
easily-traded output (outside of marriage).
2. The gender with the distributional advantage would more strongly re-
sist changes in labor markets that would make labor of the other gender
more marketable.
263. The gender with the distributional advantage would more strongly re-
sist changes in marriage patterns that would increase the probability
of separation, such as less stringent standards for receiving a divorce.
4. The more restricted gender is treated more poorly within marriage.
More broadly construed, our work oﬀers an explanation for the custom-
ary gender division of labor that matches well aspects of the institutional
evolution of societies as they move through diﬀerent phases of development.
It also suggests why a customary gender division of labor is most conspic-
uous at those stages of development in which labor markets are somewhat,
but not completely developed. One might also add that our theory suggests
that in societies with low levels of technological sophistication, such as hunter
gatherers, and modern societies, there is little need for a gender division of
labor.18 In the former case, this is because human capital acquisition is not
as important, and there is greater need for individuals to be self-suﬃcient.
In the latter case, individuals, even when highly specialized in certain tasks,
may sustain themselves through market exchange. Thus, they face little
incentive to strategically acquire skills they will not use.
While this paper provides several reasons for why the gender division of
labor might exist, it has not presented an explicitly dynamic theory which
explains the interplay between human capital accumulation, the development
and decline of customs, task segregation, and economic growth. Construct-
ing such a model and studying its correspondence with changes over time
for a broad sample of societies constitutes an interesting avenue for further
research.
18This nonlinear progression is in partial contrast to that suggested by Galor and Weil
(1996), whose theory predicts that the degree of specialization would decline over time as
the reward to physical labor declines during the process of development.
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31Activity Only/mostly men Both Only/mostly women Societies
Hunting 100 0 0 738
Metal working 100 0 0 360
Boat building 96 3 1 215
Fishing 79 15 6 562
House building 75 10 15 457
Animal husbandry 64 22 14 412
Leather working 46 5 49 280
Weaving 30 12 58 265
Pottery making 9 5 86 328
Gathering 8 14 78 396
Agriculture 32 32 36 639
Table 1: Distribution of tasks across 863 non-industrial societies. From Ja-







Figure 1: The marginal private and marginal social gains to learning a non-
specialty task as functions of pa. The region between the two vertical dashed
lines is the region in which a customary gender division of labor increases
welfare.
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